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ABSTRACT
This paper relaxes the single factor model of intergenerational educational mobility
standard in the literature, and develops a research design to study the eects of parents'
education and occupation on children's schooling. We use survey data from rural China
that cover three generations and are not subject to coresidency bias. The evidence from
recently developed matching and propensity score weighted estimators shows that the mean
eects of parents education from the standard model miss substantial heterogeneity. Within
the low education subsample, a son (girl) attains about 0.80 (0.60) years of additional
schooling when born into a non-farm household compared to a farm household, and among
the farming households, a child gains a one year of schooling when at least one parent
has more than primary schooling. Having nonfarm parents, however, does not confer any
advantages over the farmer parents if the farmers are relatively more educated, even though
nonfarm households have signicantly higher income. This suggests that income plays a
secondary role to parental education. Estimates of cross-partial eects without imposing
functional form show little evidence of complementarity between parental education and
non-farm occupation. The role of family background remains stable across generations for
girls, but for boys, family background has become more important after the market reform.
Key Words: Educational Mobility, Inequality, Rural China, Nonfarm, Education and
Occupation, Family Background, Heterogeneity, Complementarity, Market Reform, Gender
Gap
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(1) Introduction
Increasing inequality despite sustained economic growth and poverty reduction in last
few decades has become a central policy issue in both developed and developing countries
(Stiglitz (2012), Rajan (2010), Picketty (2014)). Inequality and its negative eects have
also been high on the agenda of the Chinese policymakers in recent years.2 There is a broad
consensus among the policy makers and academic economists that education is one of the
most important policy instruments to make the playing eld level for children from the poor
socio-economic background, and moderate the inequality generated by market reform. It
is thus important to understand potential disadvantages faced by children from a poor
socio-economic background in attaining the education and skills required in an increasingly
globalized and skill-based labor market.
The economics literature on intergenerational educational mobility has focused on parental
education as the relevant indicator of family background for understanding intergenera-
tional linkages (see Bjorklund and Salvanes (2011) for a recent survey, and on China, see,
among others, Knight et al. (2013), Sato and Li (2007), Emran and Sun (2011)). This
emphasis on parental education is eminently appropriate when the goal is to estimate the
causal eects of parental education on children's schooling (for a recent survey, see Holm-
lund et al. (2011)). However, this approach may be less than satisfactory in understanding
intergenerational transmission of economic status, where the focus is on the role of fam-
ily background in generating and sustaining educational inequality. Because it implicitly
assumes that parents' education is eectively a sucient statistic for family background
relevant for children's education, and thus ignores the role of parents' occupation, regarded
as the most important indicator of socio-economic status in a large literature on mobility
in Sociology (see, for example, Grusky and Cumberworth (2010)).3 This omission seems
2In the 17th congress, the Chinese Communist Party instructed the party ocials and cadres to place
\harmonious society" at the top of agenda (Peoples Daily, Sept 29, 2007).
3Grusky and Cumberworth (2010) note: \...sociologists typically carry out analyses of intergenerational
mobility in terms of occupations....., because occupations are so deeply institutionalized in the labor market,
they serve as a powerful omnibus indicator of life conditions and chances."
1
especially surprising in the context of villages in developing countries, given substantial
evidence that non-farm occupations yield higher income, and non-farm income may be an
important source of increasing inequality in rural areas (for recent surveys see, for example,
Lanjouw and Feder (2001), Haggblade et. al. (2007), and on rural China see Benjamin et.
al. (2008), Rozelle (1996, 1994), Knight et, al. (2010b), Yang and Yuing (2002), Mcguire
et al. (1996)).4
The rural economy in China has experienced fundamental structural transformation over
the reform period, with impressive growth in non-farm employment and output in the recent
decades. The share of non-farm sector in household income in rural China increased from 22
percent in 1980 to 51 percent in 2001.5 There are potential interactions between education
and non-farm occupations, which may exacerbate inequality. Consistent with Schultz's view
that education equips people to deal with disequilibria, the evidence indicates that educated
families in rural China were the rst responders to the incentives created by household
responsibility system and related reforms, and were able to take advantage of the growing
non-farm sector to reap higher income (Yang, (2004), Yang and Yuing (2002)). Positive
feedbacks among education, nonfarm occupation, and income may lead to a bifurcation
where the children born into parents with higher education and nonfarm education enjoy
a clear and cumulative advantage in education, while the children of uneducated farmers
are trapped in low educational attainment.6
A broader conception of parental economic status that combines both parental ed-
ucation and occupation is also desirable from a \measurement perspective", because it
provides a better measure of permanent income of parents. This is especially valuable
given the inadequacies of income data in most of the developing countries. There is a large
4Parents' education and occupation are also among the most salient `circumstances' in the related but
distinct literature on `inequality of opportunity'. For recent contributions in that literature see, for example,
Brunori, Ferreira, and Peragine (2013), and Asadullah and Gaston (2012).
5See National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Year Book, 2003.
6From this perspective, it is surprising that intergenerational occupational mobility from agriculture to
non-farm occupations in rural areas of developing countries has attracted little attention in development
economics. The only exception we are aware of is Emran and Shilpi (2011) which provides evidence on
intergenerational linkages in non-farm participation in Nepal and Vietnam.
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and mature economic literature on intergenerational mobility in developed countries which
deals primarily with the persistence in incomes across generations, with a special focus on
the link between fathers and sons (for recent reviews, see Solon (1999) and Black and De-
vereux (2011)). An important lesson from this extensive literature which partly motivates
our analysis is that income data available from cross-section household surveys or short
panels yield unreliable estimates of intergenerational persistence which are severely biased
downward (see Solon (1992), Mazumder (2005), Atkinson et al. (1983); Solon (1992); Zim-
merman 1992)). It is extremely dicult, if not impossible, to nd long-term panel data
on both parents' and children's income in developing countries. Income data are especially
prone to measurement error in villages in developing countries due to large informal and
non-market economy (Deaton (1997)). A natural alternative is to use two most salient indi-
cators of parents' socio-economic status routinely available in standard household surveys:
education and occupation.7 The focus of this paper is on the role of family background
as measured by parental education and occupation in the evolution of educational inequal-
ity among children in rural China across three generations (two intergenerational links:
grandparents-parents, and parents-children). We use data from the 2002 round survey of
the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) for our empirical analysis.8 An important
advantage of the CHIP 2002 survey is that it is possible to address the coresidency bias
in a credible manner for both the grandparents-parents and the parents-children samples
(please see the discussion in the data section).
We develop a research design in terms of two binary indicators of parents' economic
status: higher education ((Epi = 1) if at least one parent of child i has education more than
7Many household surveys in developing countries contain income information only for a single year (the
survey year). As shown by Mazumder (2005) in the context of USA, income data for a period of a decade
and half may be required to tackle the measurement error. Since measurement error is likely to be a much
more severe problem in income data from developing countries, one probably needs data over a longer
period of time.
8A reader might wonder whether it would be best to include all of the available indicators of parental
socio-economic status and create an index using statistical techniques such as principal components. It
is, however, dicult to interpret the estimates based on a principal component index, because ranking
according to, for example, the rst principal component lacks any clear economic content.
3
a threshold such as primary schooling), and non-farm occupation (Opi = 1; if at least one
parent's primary occupation is non-farm), and split the sample into four mutually exclusive
groups (see Figure (1) below).9 This framework allows us to use appropriate subsamples
as \treatment" and \comparison" groups to explore a set of important questions related to
the role of family background in children's schooling using recently developed matching and
propensity score weighted estimators (Millimet and Tchernis (2013), Huber et al. (2013)).10
First, we provide evidence of substantial heterogeneity. Focusing on the children's
generation, the standard specication with parental education as the sole indicator of eco-
nomic status shows that a child of a parent with more than primary schooling gains about
a year of more schooling. But our results reveal substantial heterogeneity across occupa-
tions within a given education group and across education levels within a given occupation
group. For example, within the low education sub-sample, a son attains about 0.80 years of
additional schooling when born into a non-farm household compared to a farm household,
and the corresponding gain in schooling for a girl is about 0.60 years. Among the farming
households, a child gains a one year of schooling when at least one parent has more than
primary schooling. We nd that the children from households with better educated and
non-farmer parents are the \fortunate children". A child in this group attains 1.5 years of
more schooling on average, and the gain in schooling can be close to three years for some
children when parents have more than middle schooling and non-farm occupation.11 This
provides a much richer texture of the roles played by family background across gender and
generations, when compared to the standard analysis that relies exclusively on the parental
education as the marker of socio-economic background.
9We focus on primary schooling as the education threshold to keep estimates comparable across three
generations. The proportion of grandparents with of more than middle school is too small (4 percent) for
any meaningful analysis. However, in a later section of the paper, we report estimates for parents-children
sample using middle school as the relevant cut-o.
10Most of the existing analysis of intergenerational educational mobility in developing countries including
China relies exclusively on the OLS estimator.
11The children from uneducated farming households constitute the comparison group. Among children
with nonfarm parents and more than middle school education, the eects is stronger for sons; the MB-
NIPW estimate is 2.83 years of additional schooling. But the corresponding estimate is smaller for girls:
approximately 1.9 years of additional schooling.
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Second, a comparison of the children in non-farm but low education households with
the children in farm but high education households helps us to understand better the
relative roles of family resources (income eect) and a human capital eect not mediated
through income. This exploits the fact that the farm households with high education, in
general, have much lower income compared to non-farm households with low education, and
provides a simple test of the hypothesis that children's educational inequality is primarily
a poverty problem in a rural economy.12 Our results show that children born into relatively
high income households (low educated non-farm parents) do not enjoy any advantages
compared to the poorer households (better educated farmer parents). The evidence also
suggests that gender parity in the schooling of children in the reform period is achieved
once at least one parent has more than primary schooling. This conclusion is robust across
farm and nonfarm occupational categories, suggesting that gender bias may not be driven
primarily by resource constraint.
Third, we analyze whether parental education and occupation are mutually complemen-
tary or substitutes in the production of educational attainment of children. The research
design allows us to test whether children's schooling function is supermodular in parental
education and occupation without imposing arbitrary functional forms. We nd little ev-
idence of complementarity between parental education and occupation in determining the
schooling attainment of the children. In fact, our evidence indicates that, if anything,
for boys in the reform era, parents' non-farm occupation may be a substitute for parents'
education.
Fourth, a comparison of parents' and children's generations shows that for girls, the
role of family background in schooling attainment remains largely unchanged across two
generations, but for boys, family background has become more important. While grand-
parents' education and occupation played only a moderate role in fathers education, the
12In our parents-children sample, in 2002, per capita income is about 30 percent higher than that of
the better educated farmer group. Unfortunately, there is no income data available for the grandparents-
parents sample.
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eects of parental education and occupation have increased substantially for the sons, lead-
ing to a gender convergence in the eects of family background across dierent groups. A
comparative analysis of parents' and children's generations is interesting because most of
the parents completed schooling before the reform which allows us to compare and contrast
the eects of family background in a socialist versus a more market oriented economy.13
(2) Related Literature
This paper contributes to a small but active literature on intergenerational economic
mobility in developing countries. Recent contributions in this literature include, among
others, Hertz et al. (2007), Binder and Woodru (2002), Behrman et. al. (2001), Duncan
(1996), Lillard and Willis (1994), Lam and Schoeni (1993), Daude (2011), Asadullah (2012),
Emran and Shilpi (2011, 2012), Bossuroy and Cogneau (2013), Maitra and Sharma (2010)).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper in the economics literature on developing
countries including China that analyzes the role of the structural change from agriculture
to nonfarm in intergenerational educational mobility in rural areas.
Our analysis is obviously closely related to multiple strands of literature on China:
educational inequality, economic mobility, rural nonfarm economy and the interactions
among them. A large part of the literature on inequality in China focuses on spatial
dierences between coastal and interior regions, and across rural and urban areas (see,
among others, Fleisher et al. (2010), Kanbur and Zhang (2005), Chen and Fleisher (1996),
Knight and Song (1999), Park (2008)). For insightful analysis of inequality in post-reform
period see, among others, Shi et al. (2013), Benjamin et al. (2008), Gustafsson et al.
(2008), Khan et al. (1999), Ravallion and Chen (1999), Grin and Zhao (1993). Benjamin
et al. (2005) provide an in-depth and comprehensive analysis of the evolution of inequality
during the transition in rural China. An important nding in Benjamin et al. (2005) which
is partly responsible for our focus on non-farm occupations is that non-farm income has
13As we discuss later, the farm and nonfarm distinction carries dierent meanings before and after the
reform, because the policies implemented during the Maoist era (in particular the cultural revolution) were
aimed at enhancing the social position of peasants and improving educational mobility of their children
(see, among others, Hannum and Xie (1994), Sato and Li (2007), and Hannum et al. (2008)).
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played an important role in worsening income distribution in rural China since 1995.
The eects of non-farm opportunities on educational attainment of rural children have
been analyzed by de Brauw and Giles (2008) with a special focus on migration; they show
that the urban migration opportunities aect schooling attainments of poor rural children
adversely. The structural change within the rural economy from farm to non-farm in rural
China has been the focus of a substantial literature (see, for example, Nyberg and Rozelle
(1999), Mukherjee and Zhang (2007), de Baruw et. al. (2012)). According to the estimates
reported in de Baruw et al. (2012), the rural economy in China has experienced signicant
structural change during the reform period; from 1991 to 2004 the proportion of households
reporting positive time allocation to farm activities fell from 89 percent 70 percent, and the
household engaged in farm work, the average total hours devoted to farm work declined
dramatically from 3,528 in 1991 to 1,756 in 2004.
Although the research on economic mobility in China has focused primarily on urban
areas (see, for example, Deng et al. (2013), Gong et al. (2012), Gou and Min (2008)), there
is a small but growing strand that focuses on rural China. Some of the recent contributions
closer to our interest analyze intergenerational educational mobility in rural China; see, for
example, Knight et al. (2013), Sato and Li (2007), Emran and Sun (2011). However, all of
the available economic research on educational mobility in developing countries including
China relies on the standard single factor representation of parents' economic status, where
parents' education is the sole indicator.14
We also take advantage of a rich literature on educational policy and returns to edu-
cation in China to interpret our results (see, among others, Hannum and Park ed. (2007),
Hannum et. al. (2008), Fleisher and Wang (2005), Hannum and Xie (1994), Debrauw and
Rozelle (2008), de Brauw and Giles (2008), Fang et. al. (2012), Tsang (2001)). The recent
literature on intergenerational educational mobility identies a close link between an in-
crease in returns to education and intergenerational educational persistence. For example,
14For an interesting analysis of and evidence against the single factor model of intergenerational income
mobility in the context of USA, see Lefgren et al. (2012).
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in the context of USA, Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) and Mazumder (2012) nd that
the periods with high returns to education are also characterized by high intergenerational
persistence (i.e, low mobility).15 The evidence from the literature on China shows that
while private returns to education was very low before and during the early period of the
economic reform, the returns have been increasing over the reform era (Fleisher and Wang
(2005), de Brauw and Rozelle (2008), Hannum et al. (2008)). The recent estimates by Fang
et al. (2012) show that the over-all returns to one more year of schooling between 1997
and 2006 is about 20 percent for individuals 35 years of age or younger in 2000. The avail-
able evidence also indicates that the returns to education is higher in non-farm activities
and there is a gender penalty against girls (de Brauw and Rozelle (2008)). The literature
on the changes in educational policy in rural China and its implications for inequality is
rich with many interesting and insightful contributions (see, for example, Hannum and
Xie (1994), Hannum and Park (2007), Tsang (2000), Ma and Ding (2008)). Hannum and
Xie (1994) discuss the role played by the conicting objectives of eciency and equity in
changing educational policy in China, before and after the reform. The implications of scal
decentralization starting from mid 1980s for educational inequality has been underscored
by many authors (see, for example, Brown and Park (2002), Hannum and Park (2007),
Hannum et al. (2008)).
(3) Conceptual and Empirical Framework
A large literature on intergenerational educational mobility, both in developed and
developing countries, analyzes the persistence in educational attainment across generations,
where parents' education is used as a measure of economic status. The standard regression
specication used almost universally is as follows:
Eci = 0 + 1E
p
i +  
0
X + "i (1)
15For the relevant theory underlying the link between increasing returns and lower mobility, see, for
example, Solon (2004).
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where Eci is the years of schooling of children i , E
p
i is an indicator of parental education
of child i , X is a vector of exogeneous control variables. A substantial body of evidence
based on this or variant of this specication shows that parental education is strongly
correlated with children's education. However, there are at least two features of the above
specication which requires scrutiny. First, it is implicitly assumed that parent's education
is eectively a sucient statistic for the socio-economic status a child is born into, and
second, the eect of parental education is usually assumed to be constant for all households.
When one allows for heterogeneous eects, 1 captures an average of the eects.
There is a parallel literature that focuses on intergenerational occupational mobility,
the corresponding regression specication is:
Oci = 0 + 1O
p
i +
0
X + i (2)
where Oci is an occupation dummy (it takes on the value of 1 when children's occupation
is non-farm in our analysis), and Opi is the corresponding occupation dummy for parents
(see, for example, Emran and Shilpi (2011)).
The recent economics literature on intergenerational mobility in developing countries,
has focused on education and occupational linkages separately, largely ignoring any pos-
sible cross-eects. Since parents' occupational choices depend on their education, among
other things, the standard specication as in equation (1) partly captures the eects of
occupation on children's education. In fact, there is a substantial literature that nds a
signicant positive eect of education on the probability of non-farm participation in vil-
lages in developing countries (Lanjouw and Feder (2001)). It is, however, important to
appreciate that educational attainment of children may depend on parental occupation in
rural areas (agriculture vs. non-farm), even after the 'total eects' (i.e., total derivative)
of parental education are accounted for. First, parents engaged in non-farm occupation
are likely to have higher permanent income, even when their educational attainment is
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low.16 The role of non-farm occupations may have become increasingly important after the
scal decentralization in China, because of the importance of fees collected by the schools,
especially in poor counties (Tsang (2001), Brown and Park (2002)). Second, the returns to
education is higher in non-farm sector compared to agriculture in most of the developing
countries. The expected higher returns to education leads to higher investment in children's
education, given the cost, and thus strengthen the link between parental economic status
and children's schooling.
Once we acknowledge that both parental education and occupation are potentially im-
portant for children's educational attainment, an immediate question arises about the na-
ture of interaction between them: are they complementary or substitutes?17 These consid-
erations may lead one to the following specication of the eects of parental education and
occupation on children's education:
Eci = 0 + 1E
p
i + 2O
p
i + 3 (E
p
i Opi ) + 
0
X + i (3)
In this framework, 3 > 0 implies complementarity between parental education and
occupation, while 3 < 0 implies substitutability, and 3 = 0 suggests separability.
While the above specication is intuitive and useful, it suers from some limitations.
First, we have to estimate three parameters (^1, ^2, and ^3) in a single specication, which
precludes the use of a rich array of econometric approaches recently developed for a binary
treatment, for example, matching and propensity score weighted estimators (Busso et al.
(forthcoming). Second, it is restrictive in testing potential complementarity, because it
imposes linearity in parameters assumption. To get around these limitations, we split
the sample in four mutually exclusive groups in terms of binary indicators of parents'
16In the context of rural China, non-farm occupations are positively correlated with higher household
income in the post reform period (see the evidence in Table 1). But it may not be the case for the pre-reform
period, especially during cultural revolution. Unfortunately, we do not have any income information for
the grandparents.
17The linear specication that ignores possible interactions is almost universal in the literature on inter-
generational mobility, both in economics and sociology.
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educational and occupational status:
D00i  (Epi = 0; Opi = 0) ; D01i  (Epi = 0; Opi = 1) ;D10i  (Epi = 1; Opi = 0) ; D11i  (Epi = 1; Opi = 1)
This 2 2 education and occupation classication allows us to use appropriate groups
as \treatment' and \comparison" in a binary treatment set-up where there is only one
parameter of interest.
One can also re-specify equation (3) above as follows which can be estimated by OLS:
Eci = 0 + 1D
01
i + 2D
10
i + 3D
11
i +
0
X + "i (4)
where D00i is the omitted category (the \comparison" group). The parameters of equa-
tions (3) and (4) are related as below:
1 = 1; 2 = 2; 1 + 2 + 3 = 3:
Note that in this framework, complementarity implies the following inequality: 3 >
(1 + 2). Intuitively the intersection has a stronger eect than the union, i.e., the sum of
individual eects.
Since non-farm occupations, in general, yield higher permanent income in developing
countries, a reasonable ranking of the four dierent groups in terms of both parental income
and human capital is:
D11i 

D01i ; D
10
i
  D00i
i.e., we can rank the groups, except for the two groups in the middle in relation to each
other. The relative ranking of D10i and D
01
i is not unambiguous, as higher education is
also correlated with higher income. In the context of most developing countries, it is
reasonable to posit that D01i D10i if one is interested in a measure of permanent income,
because the non-farm households enjoy higher income compared to the farm households
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even when the farm households are better endowed in terms of human capital (education).
We discuss later evidence on per capita income of parents in our data set which conrms
this ranking for the parents-children sample, but there is no income information available
for the grandparents.18 Note, however, that if the focus is on the transmission of parental
human capital alone, then the appropriate ranking is reversed: D01i  D10i . This reversal
of the rankings of these two groups in terms of parental income and education provides us
with an excellent opportunity to study the relative roles of family resources compared to
parental education as a direct inuence over and above the income eect. Under the null
that low schooling attainment is due to parents' low income alone, parents education would
matter only in so far as it aects income.19 In this case, we would expect that the eect of
being born into a low education non-farm household (D01i ) should boost children's schooling
much more than it would for a child born into a farm household with high education. In
contrast, if the evidence shows that the eects of having higher educated farmer parents is
higher compared to that of low educated non-farmer parents, this would imply that parental
education is more salient, and has important eects not mediated through income.
The research design with four mutually exclusive groups also enables us to implement an
approach to potential complementarity between parental education and occupation which
does not depend on the parametric specication as in equation (3) above. To x ideas,
consider the general specication of children's years of schooling:
Eci = F (E
p
i ; O
p
i ; X) (5)
In this formulation, parental education and occupation are complementary only if the
function f(:) is supermodular in Epi ; O
p
i which implies the following cross-partial derivative
18As noted before, nonfarm occupational status of grandparents may not necessarily imply higher income
in rural China before the reform.
19Understanding the role of parental income for children's education is the focus of a substantial litera-
ture; see, for example, Shea (2000), and Lefgren et al. (2012).
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(assuming twice dierentiability):
@2
@Epi @O
p
i
F (:) > 0
The advantage of our framework is that we can estimate a discrete analog of the above
cross-partial derivative without assuming any functional form, if we exploit matching meth-
ods (see below for dierent econometric approaches). A specic approach implemented in
this paper estimates the partial derivative @
@Epi
F (:) separately for the farm (Opi = 0)and non-
farm (Opi = 1) sub-samples using an appropriate matching method, and then estimates the
discrete analog of the cross-partial eect as the dierence between these two estimates. The
recent econometric literature points out that estimating the cross-partial eects may not
be straight-forward when the linearity (in parameters) assumption in equation (3) is not
correct (Ai and Norton (2003), Greene (2005)). The estimates from our approach remain
valid even when the linearity in parameters assumption is violated.
The available economics (and sociology) literature on intergenerational educational mo-
bility in developing countries has relied almost exclusively on the OLS estimator. We use a
number of alternative estimators suggested in the recent econometrics literature. This may
be valuable for making some progress on two issues. First, to provide some evidence on
the robustness of standard OLS estimates which impose strong functional form assumption
and also ignores the problem of limited overlap between treatment and comparison groups.
Second, it helps us take a rst (small) step to causal interpretation of the estimates. It
is, however, important to appreciate that our conclusions regarding the heterogeneity in
(i.e., ranking of) the eects of parent's economic status across gender and dierent socio-
economic groups, and over time across grandparents-parents-children are unlikely to be
driven by omitted genetic correlations in ability and preference which have been the fo-
cus of a large literature (see the discussion in Black and Devereux (2011)). Because there
are no plausible reasons to expect the strength of genetic transmissions to vary signi-
cantly by gender, and it is virtually impossible for genetic correlations to change in any
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signicant manner over the short span of three consecutive generations ((grandparents-
parents-children).
We use two matching estimators, and also two estimators based on propensity score
weighting. The matching estimators are: (i) bias corrected nearest neighborhood matching
due to Abadie and Imbens (2002) (henceforth called `A-I Matching'), and (ii) bias corrected
radius matching (henceforth called `BC-RM') due to Lechner et al. (2011). The two
estimators based on propensity score weighting are: Normalized Inverse Propensity Score
Weighted (NIPW) estimator due to Hirano and Imbens (2001) and Hirano et al. (2003), and
the Minimum Biased estimator (MB-NIPW) proposed by Millimet and Tchernis (2013).20
There is substantial monte-carlo evidence in favor of these estimators for estimating causal
eects with non-experimental data. Busso et al. (forthcoming) provide evidence that NIPW
performs best among a large set of matching and propensity score estimators in estimating a
binary treatment eect, and Huber et al. (2013) provide extensive evidence from empirical
Monte-carlo that the BC-RM estimator due to Lechner et al. (2011) performs very well
among a wide set of estimators. While NIPW reduce biases in the estimates compared to
the OLS estimates by using appropriate weighting, the MB-NIPW estimator is especially
useful, because it minimizes the biases arising from selection on unobservables. Millimet and
Tchernis (2013) provide evidence that the MB-NIPW estimator is able to correct for some of
the biases due to selection on unobservables and yield more reliable estimates of the causal
eects when the conditional independence assumption fails. According to the Monte Carlo
evidence reported by Millimet and Tchernis, the MB-NIPW estimator performs particularly
well when the estimating equation suers from omitted variables (such as omitted ability
heterogeneity in educational attainment in our case). It is, however, important to appreciate
that the advantage of MB-NIPW estimator in terms of causal interpretation comes with a
price: the estimates are relevant for only a subset of the population dened by an interval
around the bias minimizing propensity score of 0.05. In other words, the estimates provide
20Millimet and Tchernis calls it MB estimator, but we prefer MB-NIPW because it underscores the fact
that it is based on NIPW.
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local average treatment eect, similar to instrumental variables and regression discontinuity
designs (for an extended discussion see Millimet and Tchernis (2013)). Thus the MB-NIPW
estimates may be dierent from the other estimates, simply because they provide estimates
for a sub population. While these dierent approaches are not designed to eliminate the
correlation due to omitted heterogeneity, they can be useful as robustness checks on the
OLS estimator almost exclusively used in the extant literature.
(3) Data
We use data from the 2002 round of Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP 2002)
for our analysis. CHIP survey was collected by Chinese Academy of Social Science and a
group of international researchers.The CHIP 2002 data have some important advantages
for understanding the role played by family background in educational inequality in rural
China. First, unlike the standard household surveys in many developing countries, we have
the relevant data on education and occupation on three generations: grandparents-parents-
children. This allows us to understand whether the \children's generation" who grew
up mostly during the reform period face signicantly dierent educational opportunities
compared to their parents who mostly grew up before the reform. Second, the data do not
suer from selection due to coresidency restriction standard in the household surveys in
developing countries.21 For the parents generation (i.e., the grandparents-parents sample),
the CHIP 2002 survey includes all of the grandparents irrespective of their residency. Thus
the grandparents-parents sample does not suer from any coresidency bias.
The sample on parents-children from the rural survey is also much richer compared
to standard household surveys in many developing countries; because, in addition to the
coresident children, the rural survey includes information on a signicant proportion of the
non-resident children. All of the non-resident children who had not been away for more
than six months were included as household members. Among those who had been away
21The biases due to coresident sample in estimating the eects of parental characteristics on children's
human capital have been widely noted; see, for example, Behrman (1999). For a recent analysis that shows
that the standard regression estimates are signicantly biased in a coresident sample, see Emran and Shilpi
(2014).
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for more than six months, the survey counted a child as part of the household if he/she
had signicant economic connection with the household.22 The sampling procedure for
the rural survey consists of two steps: rst, sample villages are selected in each province,
and then approximately 10 households are drawn from each village. The 2002 CHIP rural
sample include 9200 households in 22 provinces .23
Another important advantage of 2002 CHIP survey in this regard is that it also includes
a migrant household survey of 2000 households that covers people residing in the urban
areas with rural Hukou. This allows us to add a random sample of the individuals who may
be missing from the rural survey because of migration. The nal sample of `parents-children'
analysis thus ensures that the estimates are not subject to any signicant coresident sample
selection bias (for more details, see below).
The Parents-Children sample
Our parents-children sample is composed of two parts. The rst subsample is extracted
from the CHIP 2002 rural survey. Adult children in this paper are dened as individuals
18 years of age or older. We have a total of 5909 rural adult children-parents pairs, with
adult children's age and education, parents' age, education and occupation identied.
The second parents-children subsample comes from the rural-urban migrant survey
which captures the long-term migrants who have left their rural home and live in urban
areas at the time of the survey. For the migrant survey, we are interested in household
heads/spouses and their parents. We focus on the household heads/spouses 18 years of
age or older. To capture the missing long-term migrants from the rural survey, we set
four criteria for our migrant subsample. First, the household head/spouse must have an
identied rural hukou. Second, they have stayed in the urban area for at least one year
or longer by the time of the survey, which helps to identify the long-term rural migrants
possibly missed in the rural survey. Third, they still have family member(s) living in the
22For an excellent discussion on the 2002 CHIP survey, please see Jin et. al. (2013).
23The 22 provinces are Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Shan-
dong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi,
Gansu, and Xinjiang.
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rural area. This ensures that the the families that are now fully urban are not included.
Fourth, they did not have a strong economic tie with their original home back in the
village. This is to avoid double counting (by both rural survey and migrant survey) and
to prevent oversampling of the migrants. We use remittances sent back to the village as a
measure of the strength of their relationship with the household of origin. We examine the
distribution of their income and the remittances. The 80th percentile of the remittance rate
is 20.8 percent of income. We then set the cuto for the remittance rate at 20.8 percent and
limit the migrants to those who had remitted less than 20.8 percent of their urban income
back to rural home. The low remittance rate represents a weak economic tie and it is most
likely that these rural migrants are not be captured in the original rural survey. Using the
four criteria, we identied 1355 adult household heads/spouses and their parents along with
the necessary information on household heads/spouses' age, education,and their parents'
age, education and occupation. By reclassifying the migrants according to the province of
their agricultural Hukou, and adding them to the rural survey sample, we have a total of
7264 valid children-parents pairs (5909 rural pairs plus 1355 migrant pairs). In our sample,
most of the children (84 percent of daughters and 83 percent of sons) went to school after
the reform was implemented in 1978. We thus can call them the `children of reform'.
Parents-grandparents
In 2002 CHIP rural data, there is a specic module providing the information about the
parents of household heads and spouses. Furthermore, this is the module for the complete
parental information of the household heads and spouses, including the grandparents co-
residing with the family, grandparents not co-residing, and also the grandparents who
had passed away. We have identied 14777 parents-grandparents pair with the required
information on parents' age and education, grandparents' age, education and grandparents.
In our sample, most of the parents (95 percent of fathers and 92 percent of mothers)
completed their schooling before the economic reform in 1978. Also, 59 percent of fathers
education and 64 percent of mothers education were aected by cultural revolution.
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(4) Empirical Results
We begin with a discussion of the socio-economic characteristics of the dierent groups
dened by the binary education and occupation classications. Table 1A presents the
summary statistics for a set of economic and demographic characteristics of six dierent
groups of households for the parents-children sample. Table 1B reports the corresponding
estimates for four dierent groups for the grandparents-parents sample.
The evidence in Table 1 shows that the households in farm and low education (less than
or equal to primary) group (D00i ) are characterized by unfavorable socio-economic charac-
teristics including lowest education levels in both the parents' and children's generations,
and lowest per capita income (income data are only for the parents-children sample). The
non-farm and high education group (D11i ) occupies the other extreme, both parents and
children have highest levels of educational attainment and also highest per capita income.
(4.1) Parents Economic Status and Children's Schooling: Heterogeneous
Eects
In this section, we focus on the estimated eects of parent's economic status on chil-
dren's schooling with a focus on potential heterogeneity across the four dierent groups
dened in terms of parental education and occupation. We use a dummy for more than
primary schooling for parental education for both generations, which ensures that the esti-
mates across three generations are comparable. However, we also provide a set of estimates
later for the parents-children sample using the middle school as the cut-o for the education
dummy for parents, because about 60 percent of households have at least one parent with
more than primary schooling. The choice of middle schools as a threshold is partly moti-
vated by the ndings in the recent literature that the probability of non-farm occupations
in rural China is much higher for an individual with 9 years or more of schooling during
the reform period (de Brauw and Rozelle (2008)).
(4.1.A) Family Background and Schooling in Children's Generation
We begin with the estimates of the eects of parents' occupational and educational
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status on the schooling of children (parents-children sample) when the education dummy
is dened in terms of primary education as the cut-o. The estimates from alternative
estimators (OLS, A-I Matching, BC-RM, NIPW and MB-NIPW) are reported in Table
2. We report estimates separately for daughters (panel A) and sons (panel B). All of the
regressions include age and age squared of father, mother, and the child.24 The specication
of the estimating equation is thus similar to that of Solon (1992). The rst column reports
the estimate of the eects of parents' education dummy alone, as is standard in most of the
recent economics literature, i.e., it provides an estimate of the parameter 1 in equation
(1) above. This is a useful benchmark to assess the results from the 2  2 education and
occupation research design. The last three columns in Table 2 report the estimates for the
three dierent \treatment" groups: column 2 for the households with low education and
non-farm parents (parameter 1), column 3 for the high education and farming households
(parameter 2), and column 4 for the high educated and non-farm households (parameter
3).
The OLS estimates in column 1 of Table 2 show that the average eects of parents'
education on sons and daughters samples are similar in magnitude: having at least one
parent with more than primary schooling increases schooling attainment by approximately
one year for a child. These estimates, however, do not account for dierences in parents'
occupations, and can be interpreted as average eects in a model where the eect of parental
education is heterogeneous across occupational categories. While the average is useful as
a summary measure, these estimates also miss heterogeneity potentially important for
understanding cross-sectional inequality. The estimates in the last three columns show
that the average estimates do hide signicant heterogeneity. The evidence shows that the
apparent gender neutrality in the average eects in column (1) may primarily be driven
by the two high education groups in columns (3) and (4). The eects of being born into
a low educated nonfarm household are dierent across gender according to three of the
24As discussed in the data section above, 96 percent of household heads are male. We divide the sample
into fathers and mothers by including the spouse of female headed households as fathers.
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estimators including OLS. The estimates from MB-NIPW in particular indicate that the
gender gap may be large (90 percent higher for sons) for a segment of the households.25
A look at the last three columns in Table (2) shows that all of the coecients across
groups and estimators are statistically signicant at the 10 percent level or lower, and also
numerically substantial. This provides a clear answer to the question posed in the title of
the paper: the children born into the low educated farmer parents (the comparison group)
are in fact saddled with the lowest educational attainment among the four dierent groups.
The evidence also suggests that the heterogeneity across the other three groups is sub-
stantial. The educational attainment of children born into parents with similar education
may vary signicantly depending on parents' occupation, and vice versa. Having a par-
ent with more than primary schooling provides an advantage of about 1.5 years of more
schooling for a daughter, and about 1.7 years for a son, when at least one parents' primary
occupation is non-farm. But the corresponding eects of better parental education among
the farming households are much smaller: about 1 years of additional schooling irrespective
of gender. Within the low educated subsample, having a non-farm parent increases school-
ing by about 0.60 year for daughters and by about 0.80 year for sons. These estimates
bring into focus the importance of non-farm occupations in educational inequality which is
masked by the average estimate in column (1). A comparison of the estimates across gen-
der reveals interesting pattern: once at least one parent has more than primary schooling,
the eects of family background do not show any appreciable gender bias (compare the
estimates across sons and daughters in last two columns in Table 2). The ip side of this is
that gender bias seem to persist with higher income when we focus on the subset of lower
than primary schooled parents. The results thus suggest that gender bias in educational
attainment may be primarily driven by parents' lack of education in so far as children who
grew up during the reform period are concerned.26
25As noted earlier the MB-NIPW provides estimate for the treatment and comparison households around
the bias minimizing propensity score of 0.5. Our estimates use 0.25 radius, thus implying that 25 percent
of the households on either side of propensity score of 0.5 are used for the estimation.
26This, however, is not true in grandparents-parents sample. Please see below.
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The ranking between the two intermediate groups (i.e., educated farmer parents vs.
uneducated non-farmer parents) is also instructive: the children born into educated farmer
parents seem to enjoy schooling advantage, irrespective of gender. For the daughters, all
ve estimators yield the same ranking: the point estimates for daughters born into more
educated farmer parents with much lower per capita household income are substantially
larger. The estimates for sons are similar according to four of the estimators, with the
exception of the MB-NIPW estimates which suggest no signicant dierence. Compared
to the estimates for daughters, the dierence between the point estimates between these
two groups for sons is much smaller.
(4.1.B) Parents as Children: Estimates from the Grandparents-Parents Sam-
ple
Table 3 reports the estimates of the eects of grandparent's occupational and educa-
tional status on the schooling of parents (household head and spouse). We call the children
in this generation `parents' (mothers and fathers) and the parents are called `grand-parents'.
This helps keep track of three generations when we compare the eects of family background
over time. Similar to Table 2, the education dummy is dened with primary schooling as
the threshold.
The OLS estimates of 1 in equation 1 reported in column (1) of Table 3 show that
the average impact of grandparents education depends on the gender: it is higher for
mothers (1.03) compared to that for fathers (0.76). This is in contrast to the apparent
gender neutrality in the average eects in children's generation reported in column (1) of
Table 2. All of the estimated eects for mothers are positive, numerically substantial and
statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, implying that, in the parents' generation, the
girls (mothers) from the households with low educated farmer parents (i.e., grandparents)
had faced the most disadvantages in schooling among the four dierent groups. Among the
other groups, the mothers who were born into grandparents with both higher education and
non-farm occupation have the highest schooling attainment; compared to the parents born
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into low educated farmer grandparents, they attain about 1.50 years of more schooling. This
is a much larger eect compared to the average eect of grandparents education in mothers
sample reported in column 1 (1.03). Interestingly, the advantage for a girl (mother) of being
born into a business (non-farm) family with less than primary education is much smaller
than the advantage derived from a household with better educated farmer grandparents.
This strengthens the nding from the children's generation above about the importance of
educated parents.
The estimated eects of grandparents' economic status are smaller in magnitude across
the board for the fathers' sample when compared to the mothers' estimates. Thus the boys
from poor economic background faced relatively less constraints on educational mobility
in the parents' generation. The pattern of estimates across dierent groups for fathers is
also dierent. First, the advantage from being born into low educated grandparents (as
parents) involved in business is much smaller compared to the corresponding estimates for
mothers (with low educated farmers' as the comparison group). Second, the dierence
between the estimates in last two columns is small, implying that birth into parents with
better education and non-farm occupation did not confer any signicant advantages for a
son over the sons of farmer parents with better education. This is in contrast to the clear
advantage for the non-farm higher educated group in the case of mothers, as discussed
above.
(4.2) Do the Children of Reform Have More Educational Opportunities
than Their Parents?
The results reported in Tables 2 and 3 provide a rich picture of the heterogeneous eects
of family background on children's schooling attainment across gender and generations.
As noted before, most of the parents completed their schooling before reform began in
1978, and most of the children completed their schooling during the reform period. In our
grandparents-parents sample, 95 percent of fathers and 92 percent of mothers completed
education before 1978. In contrast, 84 percent of daughters went to school after 1978, and
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the corresponding estimate for sons is 83 percent. A comparison between the grandparent-
parents and parents-children samples can thus provide us with useful evidence on the eects
of market-oriented reform on children's educational opportunities in rural China.
The rst point that comes across from a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 is that, for
girls, the estimated eects of family background remained broadly similar across the two
generations. The point estimates (OLS) of the average eects of parent's education on girls
are very close to each others between mothers (1.03) and daughters (1.10) generations. For
girls, the stubborn persistence is observed not only in the average estimates, interestingly
the estimates from four out of ve estimators in Tables 2 and 3 are similar in magnitude
across the two samples (grandparents-mothers and parents-daughters). The estimates vary
somewhat more according to the MB-NIPW estimator, but the magnitudes of the eects
of family background paint a picture of stagnation for girls: the changes in economic and
educational policies across the parents and children's generations seems to have made little
dierence to the roles played by family background in girls' education.
In contrast, the estimates for sons show an increase in the importance of family back-
ground over generations; according to the estimates in column (1), the average eects of
parental education increased from 0.76 for fathers to 1.02 for sons, a substantial increase in
magnitude (about 30 percent). The estimates for three groups in columns (2)-(4), however,
suggest a more nuanced interpretation; while each group has experienced an increase in the
impact of family background in the sons generation compared to their fathers, the mag-
nitude of increase is the least for the children of better educated farmers. The sons born
into the parents in non-farm occupation have gained in schooling attainment irrespective
of the parental education level which suggests that higher income has played an increas-
ingly important role in their educational attainment (recall that the low educated non-farm
households have higher income than the better educated farmer households). This is con-
sistent with the evidence that non-farm occupations have contributed signicantly to the
increase in rural inequality in 1990s (Benjamin et al. (2005)).
The increasing importance of parents' economic status in sons educational attainment
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probably reects the consequences of a host of factors during the reform era. First, the
evidence indicates that the returns to education is higher and increasing over the reform
era, especially for the boys (de Baruw and Rozelle (2008), Fang et al (2012)). According
to the theory of intergenerational economic mobility (see Solon (2004)), this is expected
to strengthen the eects of family background on son's educational attainment as richer
parents invest more in the education of their sons to take advantage of the rising returns.
This investment in sons education may be reinforced by son preference and the reliance
on a son for old age support which became more important with the market reform that
dismantled the socialist safety net. The evidence reported by de Brauw and Giles (2008)
shows that the urban migration opportunities opened up by the relaxation of Hukou re-
strictions from mid 1980s have aected adversely the schooling of poor children in rural
areas. The role played by parental resources has increased in rural schools due to scal
decentralization which started in mid 1980s and culminated in a comprehensive reform in
1994 (Hannum and Park (2002)). Fiscal decentralization compelled the schools in poorer
counties to impose a varieties of fees on the households. Brown and Park (2002) report
that the children were not allowed to attend the school if their parents had not paid the
fees (see also the discussion in Hammum and Park (2007), and Tsang (2001)).27
The evidence that the eects of family background on girls did not change in any sig-
nicant way from mothers' to daughters' generations may seem puzzling. The persistence
in the eects imply that the strength and pattern of the eects of parents' educational and
occupational status are driven primarily by factors that do not change easily over time
27Hannum and Park (2007) note "in the 1980s, the government decided to decentralize the administration
and nance of the education. after the reform, in most regions, provincial, country, township and village
governments took responsibility for schools at the tertiary, upper secondary, lower secondary, and primary
levels, respectively (p.5). ...(in rich areas) decentralization has indeed allowed new resources to be mobilized
in support of schooling, as wealthier and more entrepreneurial communities became capable of marshaling
non-public resources that were previously unavailable to them(in poor area) however, there are vast nancial
challenges to extending compulsory education under such a system. In poor rural area, the ability to
mobilize non-governmental resources is slim. Decentralization increased regional disparities in funding
for schools, and also increased family educational expenditures required even for compulsory education,
especially in poor areas where revenue-starved local government had no choice but to pass the burden of
educational expenditures onto rural households. The disequalizing eects of changes in school nance were
made worse by rising regional economic inequalities associated with market reform (p.6)."
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even in the face of dramatic changes in economic policies, signicant income growth, and
impressive poverty reduction. The literature on girls educational attainment in China em-
phasizes that whether a girl progresses through the school depends largely on her academic
aptitude and grades, and may not be very sensitive to family economic conditions (Zhang,
Kao, and Hannum (2007)). Since the distribution of academic abilities is persistent across
generations, this may provide a partial explanation for the persistence across generation for
girls found in Tables 2 and 3. Other factors that might have also played a role include (i)
lower returns to education for girls, about 12 percent lower according to the estimates of de
Brauw and Rozelle (2008), and (ii) low elasticity of parents' demand for girls schooling with
respect to labor market returns, because the girls leave their parental home after marriage.
We also underscore an important implication of the results in Tables 2 and 3. The
structural change in the rural economy from agriculture to non-farm activities has helped
narrow the gender gap in education in parental generation, because it had a signicant
positive eect on mothers education, while the impact on the fathers was weak. The
results on children's generation show that the pattern has changed: the eects of family
background on sons have increased over the reform period to catch up with the eects
observed for the girls, resulting in gender parity in the eects of family background, both
in the mean eect and also across dierent groups.
(5) Primary vs. Middle School as Parent's Schooling Threshold
The results so far are based on a measure of parental education that uses primary
schooling as the relevant cuto. This is motivated by the fact that there are only a low
proportion (4 percent) of grandparents with more than middle school (9 years of schooling).
To have consistency across parents and children's generations, we thus had to settle on
primary schooling as the relevant cut-o. However, in children's generation, at least one
of the parents has more than primary schooling in 60 percent households. This implies
that middle school may be a more discriminatory cut-o for the parents in the children's
generation who went to school during the reform period. In this section, we report estimates
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of the eects of family background for the children's generation using middle school as the
relevant threshold for parental education.
Using middle school (9 years schooling) as the relevant cut-o, however means that the
sample of low educated (less than or equal to 9 years of schooling) farmers now includes
the subset of farming parents with 7-9 years of schooling. If we use this subsample as the
comparison group, then the estimates are not comparable to the estimates reported earlier
in Tables 2 and 3 where the comparison group is composed if farmers with primary or less
schooling. For the sake of consistency, we thus use the subsample of farmers with primary
or less schooling as the comparison group, and estimate the eects of having at least one
parent more than middle schooling for the farmer and non-farmer parents. The results are
reported in Table 4.28
The estimates in Table 4 are consistent with a priori expectations: the eects of having
at least one parent with more than middle school education on the schooling of children
are larger compared to the eects in Table 2 where the cut-o is primary schooling. Con-
sistent with the results in Table 2, having higher educated non-farmer parents yields the
most advantages. The estimated eects are larger in magnitude for sons compared to the
daughters. The estimates show that having parents with more than middle school educa-
tion and nonfarm job increases the schooling attainment by more than two years for a son;
the estimate from MB-NIPW is close to three years (2.83).
(6) Choosing the Right Parents: Richer (but Uneducated) or Educated (but
poor)?
An important question in the literature on educational inequality relates to the role
played by resource constraint faced by poor parents.29 If the low schooling attainment of
children from unfavorable socioeconomic background is primarily a poverty problem, then
income transfers or policies that aect income of parents directly, or reduce the costs of
28We also estimated the eects using the subsample of farmers with 9 years or less schooling as the
comparison group. The results are available from the authors.
29For recent contributions, see, among others, Shea (2000), and Lefgren et al. (2012).
26
schooling such as free schooling would be sucient to address schooling inequality. However,
it is also possible that adequate resources is necessary but not sucient for addressing
schooling inequality across gender and dierent socio-economic groups.
Although the CHIP 2002 survey does not have data on grandparents' income, it provides
good data on parents' income. In fact, the rural survey used in this paper reports household
income for ve years (including 2002). The income data in Table 5 show clearly that the
households with non-farm occupation have higher income, given education. Among the low
educated (primary or less schooling) households, per capita income of non-farmers is about
45 percent higher in 2002; and the corresponding estimate among the better educated
(more than primary) households subsample is 40 percent higher income for non-farmer
households. In contrast, gains in income from higher education within a given occupation
category is much smaller, about 10 percent higher when at least one parent has more
than primary schooling, in both farmers and nonfarmers subsamples. Interestingly, the
low educated nonfarmers are signicantly richer than the more educated farmers, their per
capita income is 30 percent higher when education cut-o is primary schooling, and per
capita income is 24 percent higher for the nonfarm households when middle schooling is
the cut-o. Table 5 also reports average per capita income over 3 and 5 years period, and
the ranking of four dierent groups is preserved. As noted earlier, we do not have data on
grandparents income, and thus are unable to rank dierent groups according to income.
Parents-Children Sample
The estimates reported earlier in column (2) of Table 2 show that, among the households
with primary or less educated parents, the children of nonfarmer parents enjoy signicant
advantages over the children of farmer parents (the omitted group), which suggests that
the higher income of nonfarm occupations has a positive eect. Similar positive eect of
non-farm occupation (and thus higher income) is also observed within the higher educated
subsample: the point estimates for non-farm group (compare columns (3) and (4), Table
2) are consistently larger across all ve dierent estimators irrespective of the gender of
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a child. A formal test of equality of the coecients in columns (3) and (4) in Table 2
rejects the null convincingly across the board (see column (6) in Table 2). Similar results
are also observed when we use middle school as the education threshold (please see Table
4). The evidence thus is convincing that parents' non-farm occupations increase children's
schooling attainment, within a given parental education level. Given higher income of non-
farm households, this can be plausibly interpreted as evidence that parents income matters
for children's education.
A natural question to ask at this point is then whether we can expect educational in-
equality to go down if there is income convergence among the households, even if there
exists persistent dierences in other households characteristics, especially parents' educa-
tion. In other words, is reducing income inequality without reducing educational inequality
among parents sucient to equalize educational opportunities for the children. This ques-
tion can be addressed fruitfully by comparing the low educated nonfarmer group with the
better educated farmer group: is it better to have low educated richer parents than having
more educated poor parents in so far as children's schooling is concerned? Under the null
hypothesis that the binding constraint on children's educational attainment is low parental
income (and parents education helps only in so far as it increases income), children born
into low educated non-farm parents should achieve signicantly higher schooling compared
to the children from better educated farmer parents who have 30 percent lower per capita
income (with a primary schooling cut-o). The point estimates in column (2) and (3) in
Table 2 suggest the opposite: the estimated schooling gain is larger in magnitude for the
children of better educated farmers. The advantages of having more educated poor parents
(farmers) becomes stronger as the level of parental education increases from more than
primary to more than middle school. This can be seen by comparing the children from
farm households with more than middle schooled parents to the children from nonfarmer
parents with less than primary schooling (compare columns 2 and 3 in Table 4).
The point estimates in Tables 2 and 4 thus provide strong evidence that having rela-
tive richer but lower educated parents does not give any advantage in terms of children's
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schooling attainment; if any thing, the estimates suggest that it might be better to have
more educated poor farmer parents. Formal tests of equality of the coecients in column
(5) of Tables 2 and 4 show that the answer depends on the education level one considers.
When we compare farmers with more than primary schooling with nonfarmers with less
than primary (column (5) in Table 2), the eects are not signicantly dierent for sons
across all ve estimators; for daughters, it is signicant at the 10 percent according to OLS
and NIPW estimators, but not according to the other three estimators. In contrast, the
null of equality of coecients is rejected by all ve estimators for daughters when we com-
pare the households with more than middle schooled farmer parents to those with less than
primary schooler nonfarmer parents (column (5) in Table 4), even though the nonfarming
households enjoy 24 percent higher income (per capita). For sons, estimates from four
out of ve estimators reject the null, only the MB-NIPW estimates are not signicantly
dierent. We note here that these two groups can be compared directly against each other,
instead of using the children of low educated farmers as the common comparison group.
The evidence from such an exercise is consistent with the conclusions based on Tables (2)
and (4), and thus is omitted for the sake of brevity.
The evidence in Tables 2 and 4 thus strongly suggests that while increasing household
income is associated with higher schooling attainment of children, having poorer but more
educated parents may confer signicant advantages compared to the children from richer
but less educated households. Policies that reduce income inequality without addressing
educational inequality thus may only have limited value in tackling educational inequality
in the next generation.
Grandparents-Parents Sample
Although we do not have income data on grandparents to rank the groups in parents
generation, for the sake of completeness, we compare the low educated non-farm group
with the more educated farmer group. The point estimates in columns (2) and (3) in
Table 3 show that the estimates are substantially larger for the parents born into more
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educated farmer grandparents. Tests of equality of the coecients reported in column (5)
show that, for boys, the null of equality is rejected by all ve estimators, thus providing
strong evidence that having more educated farmers was an important advantage for the
fathers. For mothers, the null of equality is rejected by OLS and NIPW, but not by the
other estimators, thus suggesting a weaker evidence.
Comparison Across Generations
A comparison of the parents' and children's generations in Tables 2 and 3 shows that
the advantages of having educated farmer parents have become weaker during the reform
era, especially for the boys. It may reect two things. First, in parents generation, Maoist
policies, especially Cultural Revolution, were aimed at improving the socio-economic op-
portunities of the children of peasants. In so far as this was successful, the children of
educated farmer parents may have beneted (except for the children of intelligentia who
were condemned as the enemy of the revolution during the cultural revolution). Second,
in the children's generation, the higher income of the non-farm low educated parents may
partly oset the disadvantages of lower education.
To provide some suggestive evidence on the second possibility, we use data on educa-
tional expenditure in CHIP 2002 rural survey to explore the issue of parents' investment
in education across gender and dierent socio-economic groups. Note, however, that the
education expenditure data are the expenditure incurred during the survey year on the
children in school. In our rural survey data set, a household with one more boy spends an
additional 488 Yuan on education, while the corresponding estimate for a girl is 352 Yuan,
providing evidence that parents in general invest substantially more on a sons education
(40 percent higher). Table 5 reports educational expenditure (per school aged child) for
dierent groups. The rst four groups correspond to the case when parents' education
threshold is primary schooling and the last two to middle schooled parents in farm and
nonfarm occupations. Two interesting observations come across immediately. First, better
educated farmer parents spend more on the education of their sons and daughters when
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compared to the low educated nonfarmer parents. Although the dierence in educational
expenditure is not large when the `high educated' is dened as the parents with more than
primary schooling, the farmer parents spent substantially more when they have more than
middle school education. This evidence is important because both the educated farmer
groups (more than primary and more than middle) have signicantly lower per capita in-
come in 2002, which suggests that parents' education may be more salient in determining
investment in children's schooling. Second, in the case of sons, parents with both better
education and nonfarm occupation spend much more than the other two groups combined
(more than primary as high education). The evidence thus does not support the conjec-
ture that the low educated non-farmers spend relatively more on their children's education
compared to the better educated poorer farmers. Note, however, that it is possible that
compared to the earlier generation (grandparents), the parents with nonfarm occupations
have much higher income in the reform period, and they also spend a lot more on children's
education, thus closing the gap in both the nancial investment in education and schooling
attainment of children across these two groups.
(6) Parent's Education and Non-Farm Occupation: Substitutes, Comple-
ments or Separable?
This section reports evidence on the question whether there are possible interaction ef-
fects between parents' education and non-farm participation in producing children's school-
ing. As discussed in the conceptual and empirical strategy section above, there are some
plausible a priori arguments in favor of the proposition that positive feedbacks between
education and occupation may be important; education helps in nding better quality non-
farm jobs, and the expected returns to education for children may be higher as nonfarm
jobs depend on network. Given higher income, the ability to nance education may also be
higher for parents involved in non-farm activities.30 Another important factor is that edu-
30In our rural survey data for parents-children sample, among the low educated nonfarmers, 29 percent
have high skilled nonfarm jobs, while among the parents with more than primary schooling 43 percent are
engaged in skilled nonfarm economic activities.
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cated parents may be more eective in providing homework help and a home environment
conducive to learning. However, it is also possible that resources are primarily substitutes
for parental education in producing children's schooling. For example, higher income may
enable the parents to buy the required educational inputs (such as better schools, tutors
etc.). If the market for educational inputs is well developed, low educated non-farming
parents may be able to oset some of the disadvantages of their own educational decit
(inability to help with homework, for example). Also, the relation between a parents edu-
cation and the time devoted to children may not be monotonic. A highly educated parent
may not have time to spend with his kids, especially given the higher price of labor in
the market. This may create a negative correlation between direct educational inputs pro-
vided by a parent at home and his labor market opportunities, especially at the right tail
of schooling distribution. Table 6 reports evidence on the existence and nature of inter-
action between parents education and non-farm occupation using alternative econometric
approaches.
As noted in the empirical strategy section, a simple and widely used way to test the
existence of an interaction eect is to estimate specication (3) in section 3 above, and the
null of separability implies that 3 = 0. But the limitation of this approach is that we
have to rely on linearity in parameters assumption. Column (1) in Table 6 reports OLS
estimates of the parameter 3 in equation (3) which shows the eect of the interaction
between two dummies: more than primary schooling and non-farm occupation in a linear-
in-parameters model. The evidence across gender and generations in general suggests the
lack of a signicant interaction eect; out of the four cases, only in the case of fathers the
eect is statistically signicant at the 10 percent level. More important, the sign is negative
in this case, implying substitutability, rather than complementarity between grandparents
education and non-farm occupation for fathers' schooling attainment. One might however
have reservations about this simple test, as the conclusions may be aected by the linearity
in parameters assumption.
We present a more robust test of possible complementarity by using the the methodology
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described earlier in section 3 above. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 provide estimates of
the marginal eect of better education in two subsamples: parents in farming and in non-
farm occupation respectively. The last column reports the test of the null hypothesis
that the marginal eects in columns (2) and (3) are equal, i.e, the null that there is no
interaction eect. As noted before, this approach when estimated by matching methods
does not depend on any functional form assumption. The evidence clearly shows that
there is no evidence of complementarity between parental education and occupation in so
far as children's schooling attainment is concerned. This conclusion is valid for both the
parents-children and grandparents-parents samples. In fact, there are some evidence that
in children's generation, especially for boys, non-farm occupation has become a substitute
for parental education. This is consistent with the nding discussed above that the role
played by higher income in the non-farm sector has assumed greater importance for the
sons during the reform era.
We also check if there is complementarity between non-farm occupation and higher
education (more than 9 years schooling). We estimate the eects of having more than 9
years of schooling (complete middle school) compared to the parents with less than or equal
to primary schooling as the comparison. The results again show that there is little or no
evidence of complementarity. The estimates are omitted for the sake of brevity and are
available from the authors.
Conclusions
This paper provides evidence on the eects of parental economic status on children's
educational attainment in rural China using a rich data set that covers three generations
and does not suer from coresidency bias. We develop a simple yet versatile research
design that allows us to relax the single factor characterization of parental economic status
standard in the economics literature on intergenerational educational mobility. We use
two most salient markers of socio-economic status: parents' education and occupation to
understand the eects of family background on children's schooling. We take advantage
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of recently developed matching and propensity score weighting estimators and provide
evidence on (i) heterogeneous eects of family background, (ii) potential complementarity
between parental education and non-farm occupation in promoting children's schooling,
(iii) the role of parental resources vis a vis parental education as a direct inuence on
children's schooling, (iv) the evolution of intergenerational educational mobility across the
pre and post reform generations.
The evidence shows that the current focus on the mean eect (intergenerational regres-
sion coecient) misses substantial heterogeneity important for understanding educational
inequality. The eects of family background vary signicantly with parents' occupation
within a given educational group, and across parents' education within a given occupa-
tion group. Our evidence indicates that once at least one parent has more than primary
schooling, there is a gender convergence in the eects of family background in the children's
generation most of whom went to school during the reform era. In contrast, among the low
educated families, the parents' nonfarm occupation has a much larger positive eect on sons
schooling, which is expected to widen the gender gap. The evidence thus indicates that
gender bias may not be primarily a poverty problem. We also nd that having nonfarm
parents do not confer any advantages over the farmer parents if the farmers are relatively
more educated, even though nonfarm households have signicantly higher income. This
suggests that income plays a secondary role to parental education in improving children's
schooling.
Estimates of cross-partial eects without imposing arbitrary functional forms show that
there is little evidence of complementarity between parental education and non-farm oc-
cupation in children's educational mobility which contradicts widely held perceptions. In
fact, there is some evidence that nonfarm occupation may be a substitute for parents' edu-
cation for sons educational attainment during the reform period. A comparison of parents
and children's generations shows that for girls, the role of family background in schooling
attainment remains largely unchanged across generations, but for boys, family background
has become more important over the reform period.
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Tables 
Table 1A: Descriptive Statistics on Parents-Children  
        
Sample 
Full sample Means of Variables for Different Groups 
Primary school as the cut-off Junior middle as the cut-off 
Mean Standard deviation 
Farm  Off-farm Farm Off-farm Farm Off-farm 
low edu low edu high edu high edu high edu high edu 
Children in general 
 
          
 
  
Children's age 25.1 7.2 28.8 25.2 23.4 22.0 23.1 21.2 
Children's years of schooling 8.7 2.5 7.7 8.7 9.1 9.7 9.4 10.1 
Dummy = 1 if children more than primary schooling 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
  
 
          
 
  
    Daughters 
 
          
 
  
    Daughters' age 24.3 7.1 28.5 24.0 22.4 21.2 22.1 20.7 
    Daughters'  years of schooling 8.6 2.6 7.4 8.5 9.0 9.6 9.2 9.9 
    Dummy = 1 if daughter more than primary schooling 0.8 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
  
 
          
 
  
    Sons 
 
          
 
  
    Sons' age 25.6 7.2 29.0 26.1 24.0 22.5 23.8 21.7 
    Sons'  years of schooling 8.9 2.4 7.9 8.9 9.1 9.8 9.4 10.2 
    Dummy = 1 if son more than primary schooling 0.9 0.3 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 
  
 
          
 
  
Father 
 
          
 
  
Father's age 53.2 8.4 58.4 53.9 50.8 49.0 50.1 48.0 
Father's years of schooling 6.4 3.0 3.6 4.4 8.1 8.6 9.5 9.8 
Dummy = 1 if father more than primary schooling 0.5 0.5 0 0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Dummy = 1 if father in off-farming 0.3 0.5 0 0.9 0 0.9 0.0 0.9 
  
 
          
 
  
Mother 
 
          
 
  
Mother's age 51.0 8.4 55.8 51.2 48.8 47.2 48.1 46.2 
Mother's years of schooling 4.5 3.1 2.4 3.2 5.5 6.3 6.4 7.1 
Dummy = 1 if mother more than primary schooling 0.3 0.4 0 0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Dummy = 1 if mother in off-farming 0.1 0.3 0 0.3 0 0.3 0.0 0.3 
 
            
 
  
Parents in general             
 
  
Parents' average years of schooling 5.4 2.7 3.0 3.8 6.8 7.5 8.0 8.4 
Dummy = 1 if at least one parent more than primary schooling 0.6 0.5 0 0 1 1 1.0 1.0 
Dummy = 1 if at least one parent in in off-farming 0.3 0.5 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Notes. 1) Observations: 7264 for full sample: 2916 for daughters and 4348 for sons; 2) Observations for the four groups in the primary school cutoff:  farm and low edu (2494), off-farm and low edu 
(621), farm and high edu (2403), off-farm and high edu (1746); 3) Observations for the junior middle school cut-off: farm and high edu (636 ), off-farm and high edu (735 ); 4) For primary school cut-
off, "High edu" stands for more than primary schooling and "low edu" stands for primary schooling or less; 5) For junior middle school cut-off, "High edu" stands for more than junior middle schooling 
Table 1B: Descriptive statistics on parents-grandparents 
       
Sample 
    Mean Values of Variables 
 Full sample Primary school cut-off 
 
Mean Standard Farm  Off-farm Farm Off-farm  deviation low edu low edu high edu high edu 
 Parents             
 Parents' age 44.8 10.0 45.6 45.9 40.5 41.9 
 Parents' years of schooling 6.6 2.8 6.4 6.9 7.6 7.7 
 Dummy = 1 if parents more than primary schooling 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 
 
 
            
 Grandfathers             
 Grandfather's age 74.5 12.3 75.7 76.4 68.3 70.1 
 Grandfather's years of schooling 2.9 2.7 2.0 2.9 7.2 7.3 
 Dummy = 1 if grandfather more than primary schooling 0.2 0.4 0 0 1.0 0.9 
 Dummy = 1 if grandfather in off-farming 0.1 0.3 0 1.0 0 1.0 
 
 
            
 Grandmothers             
 Grandmother's age 71.8 11.8 72.9 73.4 66.2 68.1 
 Grandmother's years of schooling 1.2 1.9 0.8 1.1 3.2 3.0 
 Dummy = 1 if grandmother more than primary schooling 0.1 0.2 0 0 0.5 0.3 
 Dummy = 1 if grandmother in off-farming 0.0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.2 
 
 
            
 Grandparents in general             
 Grandparents' average years of schooling 2.2 2.1 1.5 2.1 5.5 5.5 
 Dummy = 1 if at least one grandparent more than primary schooling 0.2 0.4 0 0 1 1 
 Dummy = 1 if at least one grandparent in in off-farming 0.1 0.3 0 1 0 1 
 Notes 
       1) Observations: 14777 for full sample; 
       2) Observations for the groups in the primary school cutoff:  farm and low edu (11571), off-farm and low edu (690), farm and high edu (2204), off-farm and high edu 
(312); 
3) For primary school cut-off, "High edu" stands for more than primary schooling and "low edu" stands for primary schooling or less; 
  
.  
Table 2: Impact of family background on children's years of schooling  
    (primary schooling as the threshold for parental education)     
Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parents' 
education Parents education and Occupation Test of equality 
Full sample 
Non-farm,  
low edu 
Farm,  
high edu 
Non-farm,  
high edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z score Z score 
DAUGHTERS 
      
  OLS 1.10 0.57 1.05 1.53 -2.24* -2.56** 
10.78*** 3.32**** 8.26*** 11.07*** 
Matching 
estimators 
A-I 
matching 
  0.72 1.04 1.31 -1.30 -1.06 
  3.62*** 7.18*** 6.25*** 
BC-RM   0.66 1.00 1.40 -1.31 -1.91* 
  3.03**** 7.03*** 9.11*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimators 
NIPW   0.59 1.01 1.58 -1.97* -2.87** 
  (0.31, 0.87) (0.76, 1.22) (1.33, 1.83) 
MB-NIPW   0.63 0.93 1.68 -1.00 -2.95*** 
  (0.18, 1.02) (0.62, 1.23) (1.32, 1.97) 
        SONS 
       
  OLS 1.02 0.8 1 1.67 -1.14 -4.69*** 
12.72**** 5.42*** 10.74*** 15.42*** 
Matching 
estimators 
A-I 
matching 
  0.70 1.05 1.72 -1.69 -3.87*** 
  4.25*** 10.31*** 12.38*** 
BC-RM   0.62 0.91 1.74 -1.39 -4.45*** 
  3.54*** 8.21*** 11.63*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimators 
NIPW   0.82 1.04 1.74 -1.17 -4.91*** 
  (0.60, 1.09) (0.86, 1.19) (1.53, 1.92) 
MB-NIPW   1.19 1.12 1.82 0.26 -3.16*** 
  (0.17, 1.57) (0.77, 1.34) (1.57, 2.11) 
Notes 
       1) Dependent variable=children's years of schooling;   
    2) For the column (1), the interest variable=parents' education dummy, dummy =1 if at least one of parents  
  more than primary schooling, 0=otherwise; 
     3) For all columns, the control variables are children's age, children's age squared, mother's age, mother's age 
       squared, father's age, father's age squared; 
     4) For the columns (2) - (4), the interest variable is parents' education and occupation status dummy. The dummy=1 if treatment group,  
    =0 otherwise; base group is parents (farm, low edu) 
    5) A-I matching=Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
     6) BC-RM = Biased corrected radius matching; 
     7) NIPW = normalized inverse probability weighted propensity score estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001); 
 8) MB-NIPW = minimum-biased normalized inversed probability weighted estimator; 
   9) The computation uses STATA program written by Millimet and Tchernis (2013); 
   10) For NIPW and MB-NIPW, 90% confidence interval is given in parentheses, which is boostrapped using 250 replications; 
11) "high edu" stands for more than primary schooling, "low edu" stands for primary schooling or less; 
  12) ***, **, and * Denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
  
Table 3: Impact of grandparents' family background on parents' years of schooling  
   (primary schooling as the threshold for Grandparents' education)   
Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Grandparents' 
education Grandparents education and Occupation Test of equality 
Full sample 
Non-farm,  
low edu 
Farm,  
high edu 
Non-farm,  
high edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Z score Z score 
Mothers               
  OLS 1.03 0.58 0.99 1.48 -2.22* -2.03* 
12.05*** 3.66*** 10.48*** 6.69*** 
Matching 
estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  0.67 0.98 1.63 -1.57 -2.48** 
  4.07*** 9.14*** 6.85*** 
BC-RM   0.78 1.01 1.47 -1.08 -1.85* 
  4.33*** 8.99*** 6.67*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimator 
NIPW   0.62 1.00 1.51 -2.02* -2.11** 
  (0.39, 0.89) (0.87, 1.15) (1.05, 1.88) 
MB-
NIPW 
  0.66 1.04 1.24 -1.36 -0.46 
  (0.22, 1.08) (0.82, 1.22) (0.91, 1.92) 
        Fathers 
       
  OLS 0.76 0.42 0.78 0.80 -2.46** -0.09 
10.64*** 3.31*** 10.04*** 4.15*** 
Matching 
estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  0.44 0.91 0.77 -2.94*** 0.58 
  3.35*** 10.09*** 3.44*** 
BC-RM   0.55 0.89 0.73 -1.89* 0.75 
  3.57*** 9.73*** 3.83*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimator 
NIPW   0.41 0.78 0.81 -2.41** -0.11 
  (0.22, 0.62) (0.66, 0.92) (0.51, 1.24) 
MB-
NIPW 
  0.21 0.76 0.73 -1.88* 0.11 
  (-0.04, 0.65) (0.61, 0.95) (0.42, 1.17) 
Notes 
       1) Dependent variable=parents'  years of schooling; 
     2) For the column (1), the interest variable=grandparents' education dummy, dummy =1 if at least one of   
    grandparents more than primary schooling,   0=otherwise; 
    3) For all columns, the control variables are parents'  age, parents' age squared, grandmother's age, grandmother's age 
      squared, grandfather's age, grandfather's age squared; 
    4) For the columns (2) - (4), the interest variable is grandparents' education and occupation status dummy.  The 
 dummy equals 1 if household belongs to 'treatment' group,   and 0 otherwise; the base group is parents (farm, low edu) 
 5) A-I matching=Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
     6) BC-RM = Biased corrected radius matching; 
     7) NIPW = normalized inverse probability weighted propensity score estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001); 
 8) MB-NIPW = minimum-biased normalized inversed probability weighted estimator; 
   9) The computation uses STATA program written by Millimet and Tchernis (2013); 
   10) For NIPW and MB-NIPW, 90% confidence interval is given in parentheses, which is boostrapped using 250 replications; 
11) "high edu" stands for more than primary schooling, "low edu" stands for primary schooling or less; 
  12) ***, **, and * Denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
     
Table 4: Impact of parents' family background on childrens' years of schooling  
   (junior middle school as the threshold for parents' education)   
Estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Parents' 
education Parents' education and Occupation Test of equality 
Full sample 
Non-farm,  
low edu 
Farm,  
high edu 
Non-farm,  
high edu 
 
 
 
  
 
z score z score 
DAUGHTERS 
      
  OLS 1.36 0.57 1.19 1.78 -2.41** -2.25** 
9.74*** 3.32*** 6.21*** 9.99*** 
Matching 
estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  0.72 1.69 2.17 -2.94*** -1.17 
  3.62*** 6.42*** 6.94*** 
BC-RM   0.66 1.22 1.93 -1.78* -2.45** 
  3.03*** 5.37*** 10.74*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimator 
NIPW   0.59 1.26 1.85 -2.46** -2.13** 
  (0.31, 0.87) (0.96, 1.61) (1.53, 2.14) 
MB-
NIPW 
  0.63 1.24 1.87 -1.81* -1.92* 
  (0.18, 1.02) (0.75, 1.49) (1.47, 2.24) 
        SONS 
       
  OLS 1.42 0.81 1.31 2.08 -2.36** -3.59*** 
12.21*** 5.42*** 8.31*** 14.37*** 
Matching 
estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  0.70 1.29 2.07 -2.25** -2.41** 
  4.25*** 6.33*** 8.26*** 
BC-RM   0.62 1.41 2.54 -3.22*** -4.65*** 
  3.54*** 8.22*** 14.76*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimator 
NIPW   0.82 1.41 2.21 -2.64** -3.87*** 
  (0.60, 1.09) (1.16, 1.66) (1.92, 2.44) 
MB-
NIPW 
  1.19 1.61 2.23 -1.37 -2.25** 
  (0.62, 1.57) (1.26, 1.94) (1.91, 2.54) 
Notes 
       1) Dependent variable=children's years of schooling; 
    2) For the column (1), the interest variable=parents' education dummy, dummy =1 if at least one of parents more 
than junior middle school, 0=otherwise 
 3) For all columns, the control variables are children's age, children's age squared, mother's age, mother's age 
      squared, father's age, father's age squared;              
    4) For the columns (2) - (4), the interest variable is parents' education and occupation status dummy. The dummy=1 if treatment  
    group, =0 otherwise; base group is parents (farm, low edu)                                    
   5) A-I matching=Abadie and Imbens (2002)                   
    6) BC-RM = Biased corrected radius 
matching; 
     7) NIPW = normalized inverse probability weighted propensity score estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001); 
 8) MB-NIPW = minimum-biased normalized inversed probability weighted estimator; 
  9) The computation uses STATA program written by Millimet and Tchernis (2013); 
  10) For NIPW and MB-NIPW, 90% confidence interval is given in parentheses, which is boostrapped using 250 replications; 
11) "high edu" stands for more than junior middle schooling, "low edu" stands for junior middle schooling or less; 
 12) ***, **, and * Denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
     
Table 5: Income and education expenditure for the six types of households 
 
  Primary school as cut-off 
Middle school  
cut-off 
 Farm 
low 
edu 
Off-
farm 
low 
edu 
Farm 
high  
 
edu 
Off-
farm 
high 
edu 
Farm 
high 
edu 
Off-farm 
high edu   
Panel 5A: Household per capita income (yuan) 
     income in 2002 2189 3159 2449 3445 2551 3692 
3-year average income (2000-2002) 2111 2947 2318 3170 2411 3369 
5-year average income (1998-2002) 1972 2730 2155 2918 2236 3102 
       Panel 5B: household education expenditure per school-age child (yuan)                  
  Daughters 443 813 879 986 1165 1097 
Sons 528 758 779 1338 868 1498 
 
  
   
  
 Average 489 782 822 1183 992 1324 
Note: school-age children aged 6 to 18 years  
      
  
Table 6: Test of complementarity between parents' education and occupation in children's years of 
schooling 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Standard 
specification 
Marginal effect of 
parents' education 
in farm and non-
farm households 
Test of equality  
between 
     column (2) and (3) 
     
  
 
Farm 
Non-
farm Z-score 
Panel 6A: children-
parents                                                                                                                       
 
    
Daughters          
  OLS -0.04 1.05 0.88 0.77 
-0.23 8.26*** 5.02*** 
Matching estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  1.05 0.83 0.9 
  7.18 4.27 
BC-RM   1.00 0.96 0.16 
  7.03*** 4.93*** 
Propensity score 
weighted estimator 
NIPW 
  1.01 0.88 
0.27 
  
(0.76, 
1.22) 
(0.55, 
1.14) 
MB-
NIPW 
  0.93 1.01 
-0.15 
  
(0.62, 
1.23) 
(0.44, 
1.57) 
Sons 
     
  OLS -0.15 1 0.7 1.71* 
-0.86 10.74*** 4.64*** 
Matching estimator 
A-I 
matching 
  1.05 0.66 1.94** 
  10.31 3.81 
BC-RM   0.91 0.86 0.26 
  8.21*** 5.52*** 
Propensity score 
weighted estimator 
NIPW 
  1.04 0.63 
2.12** 
  
(0.86, 
1.19) 
(0.34, 
0.91) 
MB-
NIPW 
  1.12 0.59 
1.74* 
  
(0.77, 
1.34) 
(0.05, 
1.04) 
Notes 
     1) For the column (1), the dependent variable is years of schooling of children generation, the regression includes the family  
    background occupation dummy, family education dummy, the interaction of the two dummies, and the controls; but the  
    table only reports the coefficient of the interaction of two dummies;                       
 2) For the column (1), family background occupation dummy = 1  if off-farm, =0 otherwise, 
     family background education dummy = 1 if more than primary schooling, 0=otherwise; 
 3) For all columns, the control variables are children's age, children's age squared, mother's age, mother's age squared, 
     father's age, father's age squared; 
    4) Column (2) and (3) break the full sample into two subsamples based on family occupation background, for each subsample, 
    the treatment is family education background high, which is more than primary schooling; 
 5) A-I matching=Abadie and Imbens (2002) 
   6) BC-RM = Biased corrected radius matching; 
   7) NIPW = normalized inverse probability weighted propensity score estimator of Hirano and Imbens (2001); 
8) MB-NIPW = minimum-biased normalized inversed probability weighted estimator; 
 9) The computation uses STATA program written by Millimet and Tchernis (2013); 
 10) For NIPW and MB-NIPW, 90% confidence interval is given in parentheses, which is boostrapped using 250 replications; 
11) ***, **, and * Denotes statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level; 
  
Panel 6B: parents-grandparents 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
 
Standard 
specification 
Marginal effect of parents' 
education in farm and non-
farm households 
Test of equality  
between 
  
   column (2) and (3) 
    
 
Farm Non-farm Z-score 
Mothers 
     
  OLS -0.09 0.99 1.04 -0.18 
-0.36 10.48*** 4.07*** 
Matching 
estimators 
A-I 
matching 
  0.98 0.96 0.07   9.14 3.64 
BC-RM   1.01 1.25 -0.73   8.99*** 4.09*** 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimators 
NIPW   1.00 1.07 -0.23 
  (0.87, 1.15) (0.51, 1.55) 
MB-
NIPW 
  1.04 1.10 -0.11 
  (0.82, 1.22) (0.18, 1.94) 
Fathers 
     
  OLS -0.39 0.78 0.4 1.56 
(-1.75)* 10.04*** 1.77* 
Matching 
estimators 
A-I 
matching 
  0.9 0.46 1.76* 
  10.09 1.91 
BC-RM   0.89 0.24 2.36** 
  9.73*** 0.91 
Propensity 
score 
weighted 
estimators 
NIPW   0.78 0.44 1.45 
  (0.66, 0.92) (0.05, 0.08) 
MB-
NIPW 
  0.76 0.37 0.91 
  (0.61, 0.95) (-0.28, 1.06) 
 
  
 Figure 1:  Economic Status based on parents' education and occupation  
  Parents' low education Parents' high education 
Farmer Parents  
    
2494 2403 
(children-parents sample) (children-parents sample) 
    
11,571 2204 
 (parents-grandparents sample) (parents-grandparents sample) 
    
Parents in off-
farm 
    
621 1746 
(children-parents sample) (children-parents sample) 
    
690 312 
(parents-grandparents sample) (parents-grandparents sample) 
    
 
